# GOVENNANEE GTRUOTURIES OF PROFESSIONAL FOOTBALL LEABUES  nephrseniailion at mailional ascodition level 

## OIIE SPORTS INTEILIEEENOE

CIES Sports Intelligence is a research and analysis division of the International Centre for Sports Studies (CIES) focusing on sports governance and regulatory studies and created to respond to an increasing demand from sports organizations for independent and informed advice. Representing an increasingly important economic sector with a unique impact on societies around the world, the sports industry is an ecosystem that involves numerous stakeholders from within the sporting sphere and beyond. As adequate structures are required to manage the complex networks of interests and relationships deriving from this scenario, information and data become essential.

Through in-depth research of sports governance structures and regulations across all layers of the sporting pyramid, CIES Sports Intelligence's objective is to facilitate the understanding of these fundamental elements at the core of the sports industry's management and offer new perspectives on the subject. Adopting a descriptive approach, we conduct factbased analysis to help sports organizations and stakeholders interpret the landscape they operate in and assess their governance models and regulatory frameworks by allowing for custom-made reports and benchmarking studies.

With services that focus on spreading new insights and knowledge, CIES Sports Intelligence's ultimate goal is to deliver value to the sports industry by supporting stakeholders in the promotion of a better governance and management of sport and a more stable sporting environment based on informed decision-making.

## OUR AIEAS OF EXPERTISE



GUV:Nunate


REGULITORY

## OUR SENVIUES


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gEOOMIDAYY
RESEAROH


DAIABABE GHEATION G MANAGEMENT


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## METHOOOLOGY

This study focuses on a selection of 25 men's professional national football leagues (11 from the UEFA region, five from the AFC region, and three each from the CAF, CONCACAF and CONMEBOL regions) to provide a contemporary overview on the various governance models defining the structure of these organizations at global level. All leagues included in this report organize or oversee the top-tier division of their respective countries and have administrative autonomy. The primary objective in determining the sample to be considered for the purposes of this study was to include at least two leagues from each football region where the professional version of the game is played. The data collected for this report is public, retrieved from official Statutes and Regulations and, when required, integrated with additional information from specialized online articles. In a limited number of cases, the analysis was supported with clarifications from primary sources. Data has been last updated on the $1^{\text {st }}$ of October 2023.

The research is predominantly dedicated to the analysis of the structure of leagues' general assemblies and executive committees. Other equally important aspects - such as for example the analysis of the leagues' legal form - are only touched upon in this report and will be further explored in future studies. For standardization purposes, throughout the report reference may be made to 'general assemblies' and 'executive committees' even when other terms such as 'general meeting of shareholders' or 'board of directors' would be more adequate to describe specific examples (in particular, that is the case for leagues structured as limited companies as opposed to associations).

All the executive bodies' illustrations included in this study take into account members with voting rights only. Calculations throughout the document are rounded to the nearest decimal. Occasionally, this may result in rounding errors. The list of 'other main stakeholder groups' provided for the comparative analyses of leagues' representation at national association level shall not be intended as exhaustive (for the complete detail see the "Governance Structures of Football National Associations" report, CIES Sports Intelligence, November 2022).

Except for a limited number of cases, the information included in this report has not been verified with primary sources or surveys to the leagues. As such, the authors do not guarantee the full accuracy or completeness of the data.

Finally, the author would like to acknowledge all contributors who granted key support towards the completion of this research, through their knowledge and availability.

## ABBREVIIIIONS

ExCo: Executive Committee GA: General Assembly NA: National Association

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## table of contewis

| EXECUTIVE SUMMARY |  |  | 6 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| ARGENTINA | ARG | LIGA PROFESIONAL DE FÚTBOL ARGENTINO DE AFA | 13 |
| AUSTRALIA | AUS | AUSTRALIAN PROFESSIONAL LEAGUES | 14 |
| BELGIUM | BEL | PRO LEAGUE | 15 |
| BOTSWANA | BOT | BOTSWANA FOOTBALL LEAGUE | 16 |
| COLOMBIA | COL | DIVISIÓN MAYOR DEL FÚTBOL COLOMBIANO | 17 |
| COSTA RICA | CRC | UNIÓN DE CLUBES DE FÚTBOL DE PRIMERA DIVISIÓN | 18 |
| DENMARK | DEN | FORENINGEN AF FODBOLD DIVISIONSKLUBBER I DANMARK | 19 |
| ECUADOR | ECU | LIGA PROFESIONAL DE FÚTBOL DEL ECUADOR | 20 |
| ENGLAND | ENG | THE FOOTBALL ASSOCIATION PREMIER LEAGUE LIMITED | 21 |
| FRANCE | FRA | LIGUE DE FOOTBALL PROFESSIONNEL | 22 |
| GERMANY | GER | DEUTSCHE FUßBALL LIGA | 23 |
| ITALY | ITA | LEGA NAZIONALE PROFESSIONISTI SERIE A | 24 |
| JAPAN | JPN | JAPAN PROFESSIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE | 25 |
| KOREA REPUBLIC | KOR | KOREA PROFESSIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE | 26 |
| MEXICO | MEX | LIGA MX | 27 |
| MOROCCO | MOR | LIGUE NATIONALE DE FOOTBALL PROFESSIONNEL | 28 |
| NETHERLANDS | NED | EREDIVISIE | 29 |
| POLAND | POL | EKSTRAKLASA | 30 |
| PORTUGAL | POR | LIGA PORTUGUESA DE FUTEBOL PROFISSIONAL | 31 |
| QATAR | QAT | QATAR STARS LEAGUE | 32 |
| SAUDI ARABIA | KSA | SAUDI PRO LEAGUE | 33 |
| SOUTH AFRICA | RSA | PREMIER SOCCER LEAGUE | 34 |
| SPAIN | ESP | LALIGA | 35 |
| SWITZERLAND | SUI | SWISS FOOTBALL LEAGUE | 36 |
| UNITED STATES | USA | MAJOR LEAGUE SOCCER | 37 |

## bovenwanee gtauatuifs of football leabuss

## exeeutily gunmary

Professional national leagues represent a major component of any domestic football ecosystem. Normally tasked with the management and running of one or more national championships, these organizations have the potential to generate significant economic, development and infrastructure resources and, as such, to play a fundamental role in the growth of the game at each individual country level. This report aims to offer an initial outlook on the structure of football leagues by providing an overview of the mechanisms governing their decision and policy-making, with a particular focus on stakeholder representation at general assembly and executive committee level. In addition, the report explores the relationship between leagues and national associations by looking at the formers' involvement within the executive structures of their respective domestic football's governing bodies.

The 25 professional national leagues considered for the purposes of this study represent a total of 701 professional clubs. Comprising of 60 and 48 sides respectively, the Japanese J.League and the Danish Divisionsforeningen
have the largest membership bases. At the opposite end of the spectrum, with 12 clubs represented, the leagues of Australia, Costa Rica and Qatar are the 'smallest' in size. Naturally, these figures are a consequence of the number of divisions managed or overseen by each of the individual leagues. Eleven of them (44\%) represent the domestic top-tier competition only whereas 12 (48\%) include the top two national championships. The above-mentioned cases of Japan and Denmark - comprising of clubs from the top three and four domestic divisions respectively - are the only ones falling outside of these statistics.

The grouping of a league's member clubs across one or more divisions has clear implications on the mechanisms governing the relationships between internal stakeholders and decision-making more specifically. In the vast majority of cases, votes in the general assemblies of the leagues included in this report are equally distributed amongst clubs belonging to the same division. The case of the Belgian Pro League - where the five best-ranked sides are entitled to an additional vote compared to the other

Figure 1: Professional national football leagues by total number of member clubs.

## 60



JPN DEN ESP BOt col ger fra por mor rsa usa ang bel eou kor sul eng ita mex neo pol ksa aus gro oat

## GOVENWINOE STRUOTUIES OF FOOTBALL LEAUUES

Figure 2: Professional national football leagues by number of divisions managed or organized.

eleven - represents the only exception to this rule. The landscape is more varied when it comes to determining the total allocation of votes between clubs taking part to different championships. Most of the leagues adopt the 'one member, one vote' rule (OMOV) resulting in a scenario whereby the balance of votes between two or more divisions is solely depending on the number of clubs participating in the different divisions themselves. In some instances, as it is for example the case for the leagues of Botswana, Japan and Korea Republic, this may result in lower divisions being afforded a total voting power that is higher than that granted to the whole of the representatives from the top-tier domestic tournament. Alternative systems implemented by other leagues assign different weights to the votes cast by clubs belonging to different divisions. In Spain and Switzerland, for example, this mechanism is adopted to ensure parity of votes between the total of clubs participating in the top two national tournaments. In Portugal and Morocco - where each first division club has double the votes compared to the clubs from the second division - or in France and South Africa, this solution grants the top-tier members a much stronger voice in the league's decision and policy making.

Other solutions identified across the leagues included in this study see the voting power allocated to clubs from different championships vary on the basis of the individual items to be decided upon by the general assembly. In the example of the French Ligue de Football Professionnel, Ligue 1 clubs - and vice versa in the case of the Ligue 2 - hold the vast majority of votes when it comes to the appointment of their representatives on the league's executive committee. Finally, a number of leagues, including the Colombian Dimayor, the German Deutsche Fußball Liga and the Spanish LaLiga, are characterized by a governance structure that comprises of both the general and 'partial' assemblies - the latter being forums attended only by the members of a specific division and constituted to deliberate on matters concerning that division alone.

Whilst clubs represent the main component of any league's membership or ownership structure, other stakeholders may be directly involved in the decision-making at general assembly level. In the case of Qatar, the national association controls the majority of votes in the league's GA. In Poland, the domestic football's governing body is a minority shareholder in the Ekstraklasa and, as such, is

## bovenanane gtrubtures of football leabues

Figure 3: Allocation of votes in professional national football leagues' general assemblies.


[^0]entitled to a total $7.2 \%$ of votes in the league's general assembly. In Spain and Japan, the league's president is entitled to attend GA sessions with voting rights. In South Africa, this privilege is extended to all the members of the Premier Soccer League's executive committee. Interestingly, the leagues of France and Morocco are the only ones that allow for the inclusion of a larger number of stakeholder groups at GA level - as they both include direct representation from players, coaches and referees amongst others.

The vast majority (23 out of 25) of the leagues constituting the sample of this study include an executive committee within their governance structure. The exceptions are represented by the Colombian Dimayor and the Mexican Liga $M X$, where the executive functions are attributed to the league's president instead (in the case of the South American nation, a recent statutory reform has established the introduction of a series of advisory committees aimed at supporting the president in the carrying out of his/her role). Comprising of a representative from each of the 30 clubs in the league (the structure of the organization does not include a general assembly as such), the largest executive committee is that of the Major League Soccer. On the contrary, that of the Dutch Eredivisie consists of three individuals only. It should be pointed out, however,
that in this case the league is structured on the basis of a dualistic governance system whereby the ExCo - or more precisely, in this case, the supervisory board - is tasked with overseeing a separate management board (currently counting with one member only). On average, excluding the outlier case of the MLS, the executive committees of the leagues included in this report comprise of a total of nine members.

The analysis of the composition of leagues' executive committees highlights the existence of a variety of models. In most instances, these bodies include a combination of representatives of the league's members and independent directors - the latter category normally incorporating also the league's president and, in a number of instances, chief executive officer. Three leagues - those of Argentina, Ecuador and the United States - are characterized by having an ExCo that consists of club representatives only. In terms of election or appointment methods, only a few leagues, as for example the Polish Ekstraklasa and the Liga Portugal use ranking-based criteria to predetermine which clubs shall be directly represented on the executive committee. The case of the Australian Professional Leagues (APL) is the only one that provides for the direct participation of external investors in a league's decision-making processes. The technology investment

Figure 4: Professional national football leagues' executive committees by total number of voting members.

usa fra egp kor mor por bot den eou ger Jpn hia gul aus ita pol swe arg bel org kga eng ned

[^1]
## Govenanarg stuaturs of footeal lenalis

Figure 5: Allocation of seats (as \% of the total number of voting members) in professional national football leagues' executive committees.


* Any executive committee member that is not a direct representative of a club or another stakeholder group has been included under the 'independent directors' category for the purposes of this analysis.
** The structure of the Colombian Dimayor and Mexican Liga MX does not include an executive committee as such. For this reasons, these two leagues have not been included in the above analysis.
*** For the cases of the leagues of the Netherlands and Poland - both structured on the basis of a dualistic governance system - the information above refers to the composition of the supervisory board.


## govenwamee stauoturfs of football leabues

firm Silver Lake - owner of one-third of the shares in the APL - is entitled to one representative with voting rights on the league's board of directors. National associations are more directly involved in the leagues' management at executive committee level than it is the case for general assemblies. NAs - or representatives directly appointed by them - are entitled to participate with voting rights in the ExCo of ten out of the 25 leagues (40\%) included in this study.

With regards to the other side of the above relationship, national professional leagues are either directly, indirectly (through their member clubs) or both directly and indirectly represented in policy making at national association level. Indeed, in some instances, the political power controlled or overseen by leagues is considerable. In the examples of Qatar, Ecuador and Colombia, the leagues' members account for more than half of the votes in the general assembly of their respective NAs (in the case of the Gulf state the league itself is also directly represented, though with a much more limited voice. Approximately a third of the votes in the German Football Association's Bundestag are granted to representatives of
the Deutsche Fußball Liga (DFL). Similarly, in Belgium, the Pro League holds $31 \%$ of the voting rights in the National Association's GA. Only five leagues - including three of the so-called 'big-5' - are either directly or indirectly granted significantly less than a quarter of votes in their respective NAs' general assemblies. By way of example, the English Premier League - arguably the most successful domestic league at global level - is only entitled to $7 \%$ of the total votes in The Football Association's council. On average, the 25 leagues included in this study report control or oversee nearly one third of the votes in the general assemblies at national association level.

The scenario is equally varied in terms leagues' representation on national associations' executive committees. The cases of Qatar, Colombia and Costa Rica are the only ones that foresee a NA's ExCo predominantly made of representatives from the professional leagues' clubs (in addition, the Qatar Football Association and the Qatar Stars League also share the same president). Nearly half of the examples included in this study (12 out of 25) provide for the inclusion of the league's president as an ex-officio member of the national association's executive committee. In cases such as those of the Moroccan

Figure 6: Professional national football leagues' direct or indirect (through the member clubs) representation (as \% of the total votes) in the general assemblies of their respective national associations.

13

61 51

48 44 $\begin{array}{lllll}40 & 39 & 38 & 37\end{array}$ $\begin{array}{llll}33 & 33 & 33 & 31\end{array}$

Qat ecu bol ang mor mex kon orc kga den fra ber bel gul aus pol por ned jpn egp ita usa eng bot rsa

## 

Ligue Nationale de Football Professionnel, the Mexican Liga MX or the Liga Portugal, the president is, indeed, the sole league representative on the ExCo. In others, as for example in Colombia, Italy, South Africa and Switzerland, additional members to the NA's executive committee are elected or appointed from within the league's executive bodies. Football Australia and the Federación Ecuatoriana de Fútbol have an ExCo comprising of independent members only and, as such, do not allow for the appointment of any stakeholder representative on this body. Similarly, the Statutes of the Saudi Arabian Football Federation do not include any rule with regards to stakeholder representation on the executive committee, providing for its final composition to be determined by the result of individual elections. On average, the 25 leagues considered for the purposes of this report control or oversee nearly one fifth of the votes in the executive committees at national association level ( $13 \%$ is the median value).

By looking at the internal governance structure of a selection of professional leagues from around the world, this
report provides an initial outlook into the much broader area of football governance. Additional research will be undertaken by CIES to further delve into this topic and add to the existing knowledge on the frameworks which underpin the management and development of domestic football ecosystems. Professional national leagues operate in an environment that is continuously evolving as result of factors inherent to each specific country's context and, especially, competition at international level. The tendency that has seen several leagues open up to external investment to secure essential financial resources, new trends related to the commercialization and distribution of broadcasting rights, the recent discussions on the creation of cross-border leagues provide just an indication of the fundamental challenges and opportunities professional football leagues may face on a regular basis. Understanding and benchmarking the leagues' governance landscape may prove beneficial in the evaluation of the policy and decision-making structures required to navigate this intricate scenario.

Figure 7: Professional national football leagues' direct or indirect (through the member clubs) representation (as \% of the total voting members) in the executive committees of their respective national associations.



Qat col gre ang bel sul ger den ned esp ita eng mex rsa por pol bot fra mor usa jpn kor feu kga aus

[^2]
## ARGENTINA liba podefoinal de fútbol angeinivo de afa

## GENERAL ASSEMBIY

Allocation of votes in the League's general assembly (comité ejecutivo) ${ }^{1}$


League's direct and/or indirect votes in the national association's general assembly and comparison with other main stakeholder groups

CLUBS


FUTSAL \& BEACH SOCCER


The Liga Profesional de Fútbol Argentino (LPF) was created in May 2020 by the Asociación del Fútbol Argentino (AFA) - the country's national association. As part of the agreement regulating the relationship between the two organizations, the AFA receives $18 \%$ of the net income generated from the commercialization of the audiovisual rights of LPF competitions.
${ }^{1}$ Whilst the name may suggest otherwise, the League's comité ejecutivo reflects the composition and functions normally attributable to a general assembly.
${ }^{2}$ The 22 highest-ranked primera división clubs at the end of the last completed season prior to the GA are directly represented in the AFA's general assembly.

## EXEOUTIVE COMMIITEE

Allocation of seats in the League's executive committee (mesa directiva) 3,4,5

## PRIMERA DIVISIÓN CLUBS

000000

League's direct and/or indirect seats in the national association's executive committee and comparison with other main stakeholder groups

CLUBS


PRIMERA DIVISIÓN CLUBS ${ }^{6}$


[^3]
## AUSTRALIA aUsTRallan poofesional leabues

## GENERAL ASSEMBIY

Allocation of votes in the League's general assembly


League's direct and/or indirect votes in the national association's general assembly and comparison with other main stakeholder groups

REGIONAL ASSOCIATIONS

WOMEN'S FOOTBALL $10 \%$
PLAYERS $\quad 7 \%$

The Australian Professional Leagues (APL) was created at the end of 2020 as result of the unbundling of the professional leagues from the national association Football Australia. The APL holds the perpetual rights to operate and commercialize the top-tier professional domestic football competitions in the country and, as of September 2023, consists of the A-League Men's, A-League Women's, the A-League Youth and the E-league. The APL is owned at $64.7 \%$ by the A-League clubs, at $33.3 \%$ by the technology investment firm Silver Lake and at the remaining $2 \%$ by Viacom CBS - the League's broadcast partner. Football Australia has retained the regulatory functions in respect of the professional leagues, including matters relating to on-and-off-field disciplinary and integrity matters, the registration of clubs, players and officials, the transfer system, and the domestic match calendar.
${ }^{1}$ Each A-League club that is a full member of Football Australia is directly represented in the national association's general assembly.

## ExECUTIVE COMMITTEE

Allocation of seats on the League's
executive committee (board of directors)


## NATIONAL

ASSOCIATION ${ }^{2}$
SILVER LAKE
(D)

[^4]${ }^{3}$ The executive committee of Football Australia comprises of six elected directors and three appointed directors. To stand for election as an elected director, a candidate must be proposed by one member (proposer) whereas another member (seconder) must second the nomination. Amongst the disqualifying positions included in the Statutes, 'a person who is or has within the six months of the date of their nomination been an employee of a member or a body corporate or organisation in which the member is a shareholder may not stand for or hold office as a [elected] director'. The six-month limitation does not apply in the case of appointed directors, who, however, shall eventually resign from their position as employees of a member or a body corporate or organisation in which the member is a shareholder within seven days of the date they are appointed as an appointed director.

## BELGIUM pRo leabue

## GENERAL ASSEMBIY

Allocation of votes in the League's
general assembly (algemene vergadering)


League's direct and/or indirect votes in the national association's general assembly and comparison with other main stakeholder groups

REGIONAL ASSOCIATIONS

| $\square$ | $\mathbf{6 0} \%$ |
| :--- | :--- |
| PRO LEAGUE |  |
| INDEPENDENT MEMBERS |  |
| $\square$ | $\mathbf{3 l} \%$ |
| $\square$ | $\mathbf{8 . 5} \%$ |

## BOTSWANA botSNana football leabue

## GENERAL ASSEMBIY

Allocation of votes in the League's
general assembly


The Botswana Football League (BFL) is formally structured as a proprietary limited company. Including the Botswana Premier League and the national first divisions (north and south), the BFL is a full member of the Botswana Football Association (BFA). More specifically, the League was granted autonomy at a session of the BFA's annual general assembly in October 2020.
${ }^{1}$ The Botswana Football League is represented by one delegate in the general assembly of the Botswana Football Association.

## ExEEUTIVE COMMIITIEE

Allocation of seats in the League's
executive committee (board of directors)


[^5]
## COLOMBIA ロIIIS'ION MAYOR del fútbol golonblano

## GENERAL ASSEMBIY

Allocation of votes in the League's general assembly (asamblea general de afiliados) ${ }^{1}$


League's direct and/or indirect votes in the national association's general assembly and comparison with other main stakeholder groups

DIMAYOR CLUBS²


AMATEUR FOOTBALL
$49 \%$

Founded in 1948, the División Mayor del Fútbol Colombiano (Dimayor) is structured as a non-profit association.
${ }^{1}$ The general assembly is the Dimayor's supreme governing body, responsible, amongst others, for electing the president and approving the League's financial statements. Most matters related to the individual competitions organized by the League are dealt with by the juntas de competencia - bodies that comprise of the Dimayor's president and one representative for each of the clubs participating in that specific competition. Responsibilites allocated to the juntas de competencia include, amongst others, the evaluation and approval of regulatory changes affecting their own competitions only, the approval of actions for the promotion and commercial exploitation of the competition and, more in general, any other matter exclusively affecting that individual competition and not attributed to another Dimayor body.
${ }^{2}$ Each of the Dimayor member clubs is entitled to one delegate - and one vote - in the general assembly of the Federación Colombiana de Fútbol (FCF).

## ExEEUTIVE COMMIITIEE

Allocation of seats in the League's
executive committee ${ }^{3}$

## PRESIDENT



League's direct and/or indirect seats in the national association's executive committee and comparison with other main stakeholder groups

DIMAYOR ${ }^{4}$


AMATEUR FOOTBALL

[^6]${ }^{4}$ The president of the Dimayor (who is an ex-officio vice-president of the executive committee of Federación Colombiana de Fútbol) and three additional representatives of Dimayor members.

## COSTA RICA 



Founded in 1999, the Unión de Clubes de Fútbol de la Primera División (UNAFUT) is structured as a non-profit private association. The UNAFUT is a direct member of the Federación Costarricense de Fútbol (Fedefútbol). Together with the Liga de Ascenso (LIASCE), they represent the two professional leagues in Costa Rica.
${ }^{1}$ Each of the 12 UNAFUT clubs is represented by one delegate in the Fedefútbol's general assembly.

## ExEEUTIVE COMMIITIEE

Allocation of seats in the League's
executive committee (consejo director) ${ }^{2}$

INDEPENDENT
DIRECTORS
0000

League's direct and/or indirect seats in the national association's executive committee and comparison with other main stakeholder groups

PROFESSIONAL LEAGUES


## DENMARK FORENINGEN AF FOBBOLD DIIISONSSKLUBEER I DANMARK

## General assembil

Allocation of votes in the League's
general assembly (generalforsamling) ${ }^{1}$


League's direct and/or indirect votes in the national association's general assembly and comparison with other main stakeholder groups

REGIONAL ASSOCIATIONS
54\%
CLUBS - MEN'S FOOTBALL


DIVISIONSFORENINGEN ${ }^{2}$

WOMEN'S FOOTBALL


7\%

Founded in 1969, the Foreningen af Fodbold Divisionsklubber i Danmark (Divisionsforeningen) is formally structured as an association.
${ }^{1}$ Voting in the general assembly reflects the principle according to which Superliga clubs, 1.Division clubs and 2.Division \& 3.Division clubs are each entitled to a third (24) of the total votes (72) in the League's GA.
${ }^{2}$ Divisionsforeningen clubs are entitled to a total 48 delegates to the general assembly of the Dansk Boldspil-Union (DBU). More specifically, these are divided as follows: a) Superliga clubs: 16 delegates, b) 1. Division clubs: 16 delegates, c) 2 .Division \& 3.Division clubs: 16 delegates.

## EXEQUTIVE COMMIITEE

Allocation of seats in the League's
executive committee (bestyrelse)

PRESIDENT
(
$\begin{array}{ll}\text { SUPERLIGA } & \text { CLUBS FROM } \\ \text { OLUBS } & \end{array}$

League's direct and/or indirect seats in the national association's executive committee and comparison with other main stakeholder groups

REGIONAL ASSOCIATIONS
2.5 (36\%)

DIVISIONSFORENINGEN ${ }^{3,4}$

| WOMEN'S FOOTBALL | $1.5(21 \%)$ |
| :--- | :--- |
| $\square$ | $1.5(21 \%)$ |

[^7]
## ECUADOR Liba profegional de fútool del equador

## beneral assembil

Allocation of votes in the League's
general assembly (consejo de presidentes)


League's direct and/or indirect votes in the national association's general assembly and comparison with other main stakeholder groups

LIGAPRO CLUBS ${ }^{1}$

REGIONAL ASSOCIATIONS 26\%


PLAYERS
|
1\%
COACHES


The creation of the Liga Profesional de Fútbol del Ecuador (LPFE or LigaPro) was approved in January 2016 by the Federación Ecuatoriana de Fútbol (FEF). The decision followed a request from the clubs participating in the top two domestic divisions to create a league that could be responsible for the organization of the Serie A and Serie B tournaments and the managing of the broadcasting rights associated to these competitions.
'Each LigaPro club is entitled to two votes in the general assembly of the Federación Ecuatoriana de Fútbol.

## Executive commitiee

Allocation of seats in the League's
executive committee (comité directivo)

SERIE A CLUBS
0000

## SERIE B CLUBS

League's direct and/or indirect seats in the national association's executive committee and comparison with other main stakeholder groups

INDEPENDENT MEMBERS²
$9(100 \%)$

# ENGLAND THE FOOTBALL ASSOOLATION PREMIER LEAGUE LIIIITED 

## General assembiy

Allocation of votes in the League's
general assembly (general meeting)


League's direct and/or indirect votes in the national association's general assembly and comparison with other main stakeholder groups
$\xrightarrow{\text { REGIONAL ASSOCIATIONS }} 38 \%$


| PREMIER LEAGUE | 14 |
| :--- | :--- |
|  | $7 \%$ |

AMATEUR FOOTBAIL 12\%

Founded in 1992, the Premier League is formally structured as a private company limited by shares, wholly owned by its 20 member clubs. The Football Association (The FA) is a special shareholder of the Premier League. Whilst The FA has no involvement in the day-to-day running of the League, its approval is required for a number of decisions, including the appointment and re-appointment of members of the Premier League's executive committee.
${ }^{1}$ The Premier League is represented by seven delegates in The FA's general assembly. Six of them are elected by the Premier League's general assembly whereas one is appointed by the ExCo and ratified by the clubs. In addition, the Premier League and the English Football League are also entitled to appoint two mutually agreed upon delegates to The FA's general assembly.

## ExEEUTIVE COMMIITIEE

Allocation of seats in the League's
League's direct and/or indirect seats in the national association's executive
executive committee (the board) ${ }^{2}$
committee and comparison with other


PROFESSIONAL LEAGUES
INDEPENDENT
NON-EXECUTIVE
DIRECTORS


[^8]
## FRANOE 

## General assembil

Allocation of votes in the League's
general assembly (assemblée générale) ${ }^{1}$


The Ligue de Football Professionnel (LFP) is formally structured as an association.
' Each Ligue 1 club is entitled to 2.75 votes in the LFP's general assembly. Each Ligue 2 club has the right to 1.75 votes instead. Notwithstanding this, the allocation of votes amongst the various stakeholder groups may vary in relation to specific items to be decided upon by the general assembly. By way of example, only Ligue 1 and Ligue 2 club representatives are entitled to vote on matters regarding the distribution of the audiovisual rights between the two divisions. Similarly, Ligue 1 clubs - and vice versa in the case of the Ligue 2 - hold the vast majority of votes when it comes to the appointment of their representatives on the League's executive committee.
${ }^{2}$ Every professional club in the country (including those competing in the Championnat National - the domestic third division) is represented by one delegate in the general assembly of the Fédération Française de Football (FFF). The exact percentage of votes allocated to LFP clubs is the result of a CIES calculation based on the best available information.

## ExEEUTIVE COMMIITIEE

Allocation of seats on the League's
executive committee (conseil d'administration)


League's direct and/or indirect seats in the national association's executive committee and comparison with other main stakeholder groups ${ }^{6}$

OTHER

|  | 12 (86\% |
| :---: | :---: |
| ! | \| (7\%) |
| LfP |  |
| - | $1(7 \%)$ |

[^9]
## GERMANY deutherle fivall liba

## GENERAL ASSEMBIY

Allocation of votes in the League's
general assembly (mitgliederversamm/ung) ${ }^{1}$


League's direct and/or indirect votes in the national association's general assembly and comparison with other main stakeholder groups

REGIONAL ASSOCIATIONS
53\%
DEUTSCHE FUßBALL LIGA²

| $\square$ OTHER $^{3} \longrightarrow$ | $33 \%$ |
| :--- | :--- |
| $\square$ | $\mathbf{1 3} \%$ |

The DFL e.V. (eingetragener Verein) is the association of the licensed associations (vereine) and corporations (kapitalgesellschaften) participating in the Bundesliga and 2.Bundesliga. The League's operational business is managed by a separate company - DFL Deutsche Fußball Liga GmbH - which, together with its subsidiaries, is responsible for organising and marketing German professional football.
${ }^{1}$ In addition to the general assembly, Bundesliga and 2.Bundesliga clubs also form the respective partial assemblies. The functions of the partial assemblies include electing the respective division representatives on the League's executive committee, licensing committee and on the supervisory board of DFL GmbH. Moreover, the partial assemblies provide a forum of information, consultation and discussion, in particular with regards to matters that exclusively concern one division or affect both divisions in considerably different ways.
${ }^{2}$ The DFL is directly represented with 74 votes in the general assembly of the Gerrman Football Association (Deutscher Fußball-Bund e.V. or DFB). In addition, the League counts with 12 representatives voting in the national association's GA as part of the DFB's executive board (Vorstand).
${ }^{3}$ More specifically, the remaining members of the DFB's executive board and the DFB's honorary president.

## ExEEUTIVE COMMIITIEE

Allocation of seats in the League's
executive committee (präsidium)

| BUNDESLIGA | 2.BUNDESLIGA <br> CLUUBS $^{4}$ |
| :--- | :--- |
|  |  |

DFL GMBH
MANAGEMENT
BOARD ${ }^{5}$
0

League's direct and indirect seats in the national association's executive committee and comparison with other main stakeholder groups

REGIONAL ASSOCIATIONS

|  | $6(40 \%)$ |
| :---: | :---: |
| DEUTSCHE FUBBALL LIGA ${ }^{6}$ |  |
|  | 4 (27\%) |
| WOMEN'S FOOTBALL |  |
|  | 1 (7\%) |

[^10]
## ITALY

## 

## general assembil

Allocation of votes in the League's
general assembly (assemblea)


20
SERIE A
CLUBS

League's direct and/or indirect votes in the national association's general assembly and comparison with other main stakeholder groups


SERIE A CLUBS ${ }^{2}$ 12\%


COACHES


The Lega Nazionale Professionisti Serie A is structured as a private association. It was formed in July 2010, when it replaced the Lega Calcio as result of the clubs' decision to create two separate leagues for the first and the second division.
${ }^{1}$ Voting power amongst the professional leagues is divided as follows: a) Serie $A-12 \%$, b) Serie $B$ (second division) - $5 \%$, c) Lega Pro (third division) - $17 \%$.
${ }^{2}$ Each Serie A club is represented by a delegate in the general assembly of the Federazione Italiana Giuoco Calcio (FIGC).

## ExECUTIVE COMMITITE

Allocation of seats in the League's
executive committee (consiglio)


League's direct and indirect seats in the national association's executive committee and comparison with other main stakeholder groups


[^11]
## JAPAN Japal PROFESOONAL FOOTBALL LEABUE

## GENERAL ASSEMBIY

Allocation of votes in the League's
general assembly


League's direct and/or indirect votes in the national association's general assembly and comparison with other main stakeholder groups

REGIONAL ASSOCIATIONS
60\%
J1 LEAGUE CLUBS¹
$\rightarrow$ NATIONAL LEAGUES ${ }^{2}$ 5\%
J.LEAGUE
.....|
$1 \%$

Structured as a public interest incorporated association, the J.League was founded in November 1991 with the goal of raising the level of Japanese football. Whilst operating under the umbrella of the Japan Football Association (JFA), the J.League maintains control over the broadcasting, product and other rights arising from the holding of professional football matches.
${ }^{1}$ Each J1 League club is represented by one delegate in the general assembly of the Japan Football Association.
${ }^{2}$ More specifically, one representative each from the J.League, the Japan Football League (fourth division) and the Women's Football League.

## Execuive commitiee

Allocation of seats in the League's
executive committee ${ }^{3,4}$


League's direct and/or indirect seats in the national association's executive committee and comparison with other main stakeholder groups

REGIONAL ASSOCIATIONS

|  | $9(33 \%)$ |
| :---: | :---: |
| J.LEAGUE ${ }^{6}$ |  |
| $\square 1$ (4\%) |  |
| women's league |  |
| $\\|$ \| (4\%) |  |
| OTHER ${ }^{\prime}$ |  |
|  | I7 (63\%) |

[^12]
# KOREA REPUBLIO KOREA PROFESSOONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE 

## GENERal assembiy

Allocation of votes in the League's
general assembly

League's direct and/or indirect votes in the national association's general assembly and comparison with other main stakeholder groups

REGIONAL ASSOCIATIONS
$\square \mathbf{5} \%$

K LEAGUE CLUBS $1^{11} 36 \%$


K LEAGUE ${ }^{2}$


Founded in 1983, the Korea Professional Football League (K League) is forrmally structured as an incorporated association.
${ }^{1}$ Each of the 12 K League 1 clubs is represented by one delegate to the general assembly of the Korea Football Association (KFA).
${ }^{2}$ The K League is represented by one delegate in the KFA's general assembly.

## ExeUUTIVE COMMITTEE

Allocation of seats in the League's
executive committee ${ }^{3}$


League's direct and indirect seats in the national association's executive committee and comparison with other main stakeholder groups ${ }^{5}$

PLAYERS

|  | 6 (2] $\%$ |
| :---: | :---: |
| AMATEUR FOOTBALL |  |
|  | 6 (21\%) |
| K LEAGUE |  |

[^13]
## MEXICO LIGA MX

## beneral assembiy



The structure of the Liga MX also comprises of the presidents' committee (comité de presidentes) - a working committee whose agreements constitute an obligation for all the clubs in the League. The presidents' committee comprises of the presidents of each Liga MX club, the executive president of the League and the president of the executive committee of the Federación Mexicana de Fútbol (FMF). Amongst the competences of the committee is to discuss any matter related to the operation of the Liga MX competitions and national and international tournaments in which its member clubs take part. The proposals issued by the presidents' committee shall be evaluated by the League's committee for sporting development (comité de desarrollo deportivo) first and subsequently presented to the general assembly.
${ }^{2}$ The Liga MX's general assembly may elect up to three delegates to represent the League in the general assembly of the Federación Mexicana de Fútbol.
${ }^{3}$ For the purposes of this analysis, the votes (or seats in the case of the ExCo) allocated to the Liga MX Femenil are included under the women's football category as opposed of being part of the professional leagues.

## ExeUUTIVE COMMITTEE

Allocation of seats in the League's
executive committee ${ }^{4}$

PRESIDENT
(

[^14]
## MOROCOO LIGUE Nationale de football professionnel

## General assembil

Allocation of votes in the League's
general assembly (assemblée générale)


League's direct and/or indirect votes in the national association's general assembly and comparison with other main stakeholder groups


BOTOLA PRO CLUBS ${ }^{1}$

REGIONAL LEAGUES 24\%

The Ligue Nationale de Football Professionnel (LNFP) is an association created by the Fédération Royale Marocaine de Football (FRMF) in 2015.
' Each Botola Pro D1 club is entitled to two votes in the League's general assembly. Each Botola Pro D2 clubs has the right to one vote.
${ }^{2}$ Each Botola Pro D1 club is represented by one delegate in the general assembly of the Fédération Royale Marocaine de Football (FRMF). Botola Pro D2 clubs are represented by a total of eight delegates instead, elected by the presidents of the clubs participating in the second division.

## EXEQUTIVE COMMIITEE

Allocation of seats in the League's
executive committee (comité directeur) ${ }^{3,4}$

|  | NATIONAL | BOTOLA PRO | BOTOLA PRO <br> PRESIDENT <br> ASSOCIATION |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| PLAYERS | COACHES CLUBS |  |  |

League's direct and indirect seats in the national association's executive committee and comparison with other main stakeholder groups ${ }^{7}$


[^15]
## NETHERLANDS ExEDIVISIE

## GENERal assembiy

Allocation of votes in the League's general assembly (vergadering van vennoten) ${ }^{1}$


The League was founded in 1956. However, it is only since 1997 that the 18 Eredivisie clubs have united in an independent legal form - the Eredivisie CV (commanditaire vennootschap or limited partnership).
${ }^{1}$ A total of four general assemblies are normally held during the course of one year. In addition to these, the Eredivisie regularly holds separate meetings with club representatives from specific areas (e.g. commercial or CSR) to discuss and prepare the various items to be submitted for the approval of the general assembly.
${ }^{2}$ The Eredivisie is represented by a total of 15 delegates in the general assembly of the Royal Dutch Football Association (Koninklijke Nederlandse Voetbal Bond or KNVB).

## ExEEUTIVE COMMIITIEE

Allocation of seats in the League's
executive committee (raad van
commissarissen) ${ }^{3}$

| PRESIDENT ${ }^{4}$ | CLUBS | AMATEUR FOOTBALL | \\| [33\%] |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  |
|  |  | PROFESSIONAL FOOTBALL5 |  |
| - |  | $\rightarrow$ | \\| $33 \%$ ) |
|  |  | EREDIVISIE |  |
|  |  | -.... | 0.5 (16.5\%) |

[^16]
## POLAND EKYSTRAKLLSAA

## General assembil

Allocation of votes in the League's
general assembly (walne zgromadzenie)


League's direct and/or indirect votes in the National Association's General Assembly and comparison with other main stakeholder groups
$\stackrel{\text { REGIONAL ASSOCIATIONS }}{\square} \mathbf{5 1 \%}$


EKSTRAKLASA CLUBS ${ }^{1}$ 27\%

COACHES


3\%

Founded in 2005, the Ekstraklasa is formally structured as a joint-stock company (spółka akcyjna or SA). As reflected by the allocation of votes in the general assembly, the Ekstraklasa clubs own a total of $92.8 \%$ of shares in the League ( $5.2 \%$ per club) whereas the Polish Football Association (Polski Zwiazek Pilki Noznej - PZPN) controls the remaining 7.2\%.
${ }^{1}$ The Ekstraklasa is represented by a total of 32 delegates - and 32 votes - in the PZPN's general assembly. Clubs ranked 1-14 in the last completed season prior to the general assembly are entitled to two votes each. The 15th-placed club and the three newly-promoted clubs have the right to one vote instead.

## Executive commitiee

Allocation of seats in the League's
executive committee (rada nadzorcza) ${ }^{2}$
NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION

League's direct and indirect seats in the national association's executive committee and comparison with other main stakeholder groups

PROFESSIONAL CLUBS


REGIONAL ASSOCIATIONS


[^17]
## PORTUGAL <br> LIBA PORTUUUESA DE FUTEBOL PRDFISSOONAL

## General assembiy

Allocation of votes in the League's
general assembly

League's direct and/or indirect votes in the national association's general assembly and comparison with other main stakeholder groups


REGIONAL ASSOCIATIONS
$\square \mathbf{2 6} \%$
LIGA PORTUGAL²

AMATEUR CLUBS $\quad 18 \%$


COACHES 7\%

The Liga Portuguesa de Futebol Profissional (also referred to as Liga Portugal) is structured as a non-profit private association.
${ }^{1}$ Each I Liga club is entitled to two votes in the League's general assembly. Each II Liga club has the right to one vote instead.
${ }^{2}$ More specifically, 14 delegates representing I Liga clubs and six delegates representing II Liga clubs. Three of the I Liga delegates are designated by Futebol Clube do Porto, Sport Lisboa e Benfica and Sporting Clube de Portugal. The remaining eleven are appointed by the other clubs in the top division according to their ranking over the four seasons prior to the election. A similar ranking system is used to determine the clubs entitled to appoint the six II Liga delegates.

## Executive commitiee

Allocation of seats in the League's
executive committee

PRESIDENT


I LIGA CLUBS ${ }^{4}$
-
-

League's direct and indirect seats in the national association's executive committee and comparison with other main stakeholder groups ${ }^{6}$

OTHER
${ }^{3}$ One member of the Federação Portuguesa de Futebol's (FPF) executive committee.
${ }^{4}$ Representatives of the three highest-ranked clubs across the four seasons prior to the election and two additional club representatives co-opted by them.
${ }^{5}$ Members appointed by the other II Liga clubs and representing clubs that have been taking part in professional competitions for at least more than one consecutive season.
${ }^{6}$ The Liga Portugal's president is an ex-officio member - and vice-president - of the national association's executive committee. No other stakeholder representation rule is provided for the remaining members of the FPF's executive committee. As such, the final composition of this body depends on the result of the individual elections.

## QATAR OATAR GTARS LEABUE

## GENERAL ASSEMBIY

Allocation of votes in the league's
general assembly

League's direct and/or indirect votes in the national association's general assembly and comparison with other main stakeholder groups ${ }^{2}$


QSL CLUBS

QSL MANAGEMENT 6\%

The Qatar Stars League Management (OSLM) is an independent entity structured as private foundation for public benefit. It was established by the Qatar Football Association (QFA) in 2008.
${ }^{1}$ The QFA is entitled to a total of 15 votes in the League's general assembly. Each OSL club has the right to one vote instead.
${ }^{2}$ Each QSL Club has the right to one vote in the general assembly of the Qatar Football Association. The QSLM is also granted one vote.

## ExEEUTIVE COMMIITIEE

Allocation of seats in the League's
executive committee (executive office)

NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION ${ }^{3}$


PLAYERS ${ }^{4}$
OTHER ${ }^{5}$


League's direct and indirect seats in the national association's executive committee and comparison with other main stakeholder groups ${ }^{6}$

CLUBS


[^18]
## SAUDI ARABIA SAUOI PRO LEAUUE

## General assembil

Allocation of votes in the League's
general assembly

League's direct and/or indirect votes in the national association's general assembly and comparison with other main stakeholder groups


SAUDI PRO LEAGUE CLUBS 37\%

The Saudi Pro League (SPL) - which was established in 2008 under the umbrella of the Saudi Arabian Football Federation (SAFF) - is in charge of managing the highest division of professional football in Saudi Arabia. As stated on the League's website, the SPL 'operates with full administrative and financial independence, and holds all commercial rights to the league competitions'.
${ }^{1}$ Each SPL club is represented by one delegate - and one vote - in the general assembly of the SAFF. The other clubs represented are those competing in the first division (with a total of $20 \%$ of votes), the second division (20\%), the third division (16\%) and the fourth division (6\%).

## ExEEUTIVE COMMIITIEE

Allocation of seats in the League's
executive committee (board of directors) ${ }^{2}$

PRESIDENT
VICE PRESIDENT


NATIONAL
CEO ${ }^{3}$ ASSOCIATION

[^19]
## SOUTH AFRICA PREIIER SOOCER LEABUE

## general assembil

Allocation of votes in the League's general assembly (general meeting) ${ }^{1}$


League's direct and/or indirect votes in the national association's general assembly and comparison with other main stakeholder groups


The National Soccer League - which conducts its affairs under the name of Premier Soccer League - is formally structured as a private association.
${ }^{1}$ Each Premier Division club is entitled to ten votes in the League's general assembly. Each of the National First Division clubs and members of the PSL's executive committee have the right to two and one vote respectively. The ExCo members, however, are not allowed to vote in the context of the election of the executive committee itself.
${ }^{2}$ Formally a special member of South African Football Association (SAFA), the Premier Soccer League is represented by six delegates in the national association's general assembly.
${ }^{3}$ The ten SAFA's associate members - a group including the associations of coaches, futsal and national defence forces amongst others.

## Execotive commitiee

Allocation of seats in the League's
executive committee ${ }^{4}$


CLUBS
D(D) D

League's direct and indirect seats in the national association's executive committee and comparison with other main stakeholder groups

REGIONAL ASSOCIATIONS

PREMIER SOCCER LEAGUE ${ }^{5}$
I

36 188\%/]
$4(10 \%)$

[^20]
## SPAIN lallga

## general assembil

Allocation of votes in the League's
general assembly (asamblea genera) ${ }^{1,2}$


League's direct and indirect votes in the national association's general assembly and comparison with other stakeholder groups



REGIONAL ASSOCIATIONS


COACHES


Founded in 1984, the Liga Nacional de Fútbol Profesional (Liga) is formally structured as a private sports association.
${ }^{1}$ The total number of votes in the general assembly shall be the same for both the Primera and the Segunda División clubs. As such, each Primera División club is entitled to 1.1 vote in the GA, whereas each Segunda División club has the right to one vote.
${ }^{2}$ In addition to the general assembly, Primera and Segunda División Clubs also form the respective juntas de división. Amongst others, the responsibilities of each junta de división include a) electing the respective representatives on the league's executive committee, b) deciding on the criteria according to which the revenues generated by each competition are distributed amongst its members and c) approving the actions for the promotion and commercial exploitation of individual competitions, when these affect only clubs that are part of the same division.
${ }^{3}$ A total of 20 LaLiga clubs (as of August 2023, 11 from the Primera División and nine from the Segunda División) are represented in the general assembly of the Real Federación Española de Fútbol (RFEF),

## Exeditive conmilite

Allocation of seats in the League's
executive committee (comisión delegada)

PRESIDENT
(D)

PRIMERA DIVISIÓN
SEGUNDA DIVISIÓN
CLUBS ${ }^{4}$
$0 \infty$

League's direct and/or indirect seats in the national association's executive committee and comparison with other main stakeholder groups


[^21]
## SWIIIZERLAND SWIISS FOOTBALL LEAGUE

## GENERAL ASSEMBIY

Allocation of votes in the League's
general assembly (assemblée générale) ${ }^{1}$


League's direct and/or indirect votes in the national association's general assembly and comparison with other main stakeholder groups

AMATEUR FOOTBALL $\mathbf{4 7 \%}$
SWISS FOOTBALL LEAGUE²
28\%
SEMI-PROFESSIONAL FOOTBALL
26\%

The Swiss Football League (SFL) represents one of the three divisions of the Association Suisse de Football (ASF) - the others being the Première Ligue (semi-professional football) and the Ligue Amateur (amateur football). The SFL in itself is structured as an association.

For the purposes of this study, the names of the League's bodies, the national association and the NA sections are indicated in their French version.
The total number of votes in the SFL's General Assembly shall be the same for both the Super League and the Challenge League clubs. As such, each Super League Club is entitled to one vote in the GA, whereas each Challenge League club has the right to 1.2 votes.
${ }^{2}$ The SFL is represented by a total of 28 delegates in the national association's general assembly.

## ExECUTIVE COMMITIEE

Allocation of seats in the League's
executive committee (Comité)

## CLUBS ${ }^{3}$ <br> -ゃ००००००

INDEPENDENT
DIRECTOR
(

League's direct and/or indirect seats in the national association's executive committee and comparison with other main stakeholder groups

AMATEUR FOOTBALL

|  | $2(29 \%)$ |
| :---: | :---: |
| SWISS FOOTBALL LEAGUE ${ }^{4}$ | $2(29 \%)$ |
|  |  |
| SEMI-PROFESSIONALFOOTBALL | 2 (29\%) |
|  |  |

[^22]
## USA <br> MAJOR LEABUE SOOEER

## GENERAL ASSEMBIY

Allocation of votes in the League's
general assembly ${ }^{1}$

League's direct and/or indirect votes in the national association's general assembly and comparison with other main stakeholder groups

| PLAYERS <br> AMATEUR FOOTBALL | $\mathbf{3 3} \%$ |
| :--- | :--- |
| $\square$ | $\mathbf{2 0} \%$ |
| YOUTH FOOTBALL | $\mathbf{2 0} \%$ |

PROFESSIONAL FOOTBALL²
20\%
MAJOR LEAGUE SOCCER
10\%

The Major League Soccer (MLS) was officially formed in February 1995 as a limited liability company (LLC) under Delaware law.
${ }^{1}$ The MLS's structure does not include a general assembly as such. Unless otherwise provided by the MLS LLC Agreement (the basic ownership agreement for MLS), the sole authority to manage, control and make all decisions relating to Major League Soccer rests with the board of governors - the composition of which is detailed in the illustration below.
${ }^{2}$ The professional council - which comprises of the Major League Soccer, the United Soccer League (USL), the National Women's Soccer League (NWSL), the North American Soccer League (NASL) and the National Independent Soccer Association (NISA) - is entitled to 20\% of the total votes in the general assembly of the United States Soccer Federation (USSF). The exact percentage of votes allocated to the MLS is the result of a CIES calculation based on the best available information.

## ExeUUTIVE COMNITTEE

Allocation of seats in the League's executive committee (board of governors) ${ }^{3}$

CLUBS ${ }^{4,5}$ 9099999969696969

League's direct and/or indirect seats in the national association's executive committee and comparison with other main stakeholder groups

PLAYERS

| $\square$ |  |
| :--- | :--- |
| YOUTH FOOTBALL <br> $\square$ | $4(18 \%)]$ |

PROFESSIONAL FOOTBALL


[^23]| Avenue DuPeyrou 1 | Phone $+41(0) 327183900$ <br> 2000 Neuchâtel |
| :--- | :--- |
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| Switzerland | sports.intelligence@cies.ch |

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[^0]:    * The structure of the Major League Soccer does not include a general assembly as such. For this reason, the league has not been included in the above analysis

[^1]:    * The structure of the Colombian Dimayor and Mexican Liga MX does not include an executive committee as such. For this reason, these two leagues have not been included in the above analysis.

[^2]:    * The executive committees of the national associations of Australia and Ecuador comprise of independent members only.
    ** The Statutes of the Saudi Arabian Football Federation (SAFF) do not include any specific stakeholder representation rule for positions on the executive committee. The final composition of the ExCo is determined by the result of the individual elections.

[^3]:    ${ }^{3}$ In terms of roles, the mesa directiva includes the League's president, three vice-presidents ( $1^{\text {st }}, 2^{\text {nd }}$ and $3^{r d}$ ), one secretary and one assistant secretary.
    ${ }^{4}$ The president and the other members of the mesa directiva are elected by the general assembly as part of the list presented by the winning presidential candidate.
    ${ }^{5}$ In addition to the comité ejecutivo and the mesa directiva, the League's structure also includes the consejo directivo - a permanent advisory body that collaborates with the management and administration of the League. The consejo directivo comprises of the LPF's president as well as the presidents of C.A. River Plate, C.A. Boca Juniors, Racing Club de Avellaneda, C.A. Independiente and C.A. San Lorenzo de Almagro.
    ${ }^{6}$ Each presidential candidate's list for positions on the AFA executive committee shall include eleven primera división club representatives (plus four as alternates).

[^4]:    ${ }^{2}$ A non-executive director (NED) more specifically.

[^5]:    ${ }^{2}$ Formally referred to in the Statutes as 'legal governance and risk coordinator - board secretary'.
    ${ }^{3}$ The general secretary of the Botswana Football Association (who is an ex-officio member of the League's ExCo) and one additional BFA representative.
    ${ }^{4}$ The president of the Botswana Football League is an ex-officio member of the national association's executive committee.
    ${ }^{5}$ The executive committee of the Botswana Football Association comprises of a total 12 members: the president, two vice-presidents, four representatives of regional associations, one representative of the BFL and four ordinary members (including at least one female) to be elected by the general assembly and for which no specific stakeholder representation rule is provided.

[^6]:    ${ }^{3}$ The structure of the Dimayor does not include an executive committee as such. Notwithstanding the competences assigned to the general assembly and the individual juntas de competencia, the League's executive functions are conferred to the president. The responsibilities of the president include, among others, ensuring the League's compliance with the Statutes, general regulations and other agreements adopted by the Dimayor bodies, presenting to the general assembly the activity reports, financial plans and marketing and commercialization projects and submitting proposals on competition formats and technical matters. Within this context, the structure of the League was expanded in July 2023 with the introduction of a series of advisory committees (e.g. the finance and administration committee, the football security committee and the development committee) aimed at supporting the president in the carrying out of his/her role.

[^7]:    ${ }^{3}$ The Divisionsforeningen is entitled to one representative on the DBU's executive committee. In addition, it elects one of the national association's vice-presidents jointly with the representatives of the clubs from the top three divisions of women's football.
    ${ }^{4}$ The election of the Divisionsforeningen representatives to the DBU's executive ccommittee takes place at the winter meetings of the League's general assembly.
    The Divisionsforeningen president is an ex-officio member of the national association's ExCo, unless already elected as one of its vice-presidents (see note above).

[^8]:    ${ }^{2}$ The illustration above refers to the current composition of the executive committee. The Statutes indicate that 'the board shall consist of not less than two directors, one of whom shall be the chair and one of whom shall be the chief executive'
    ${ }^{3}$ One member appointed by the Premier League's board subject to ratification by the general assembly. In addition, the Premier League and the English Football League are entitled to appoint a mutually agreed upon member to The FA's board of directors.

[^9]:    ${ }^{3}$ At least three of these members shall be representatives of the top five French clubs in the UEFA coefficient ranking.
    ${ }^{4}$ One of the independent members shall be proposed by the executive committee of the French Football Federation.
    ${ }^{5}$ The president of Foot Unis, the National Organization of Professional Football Employers.
    ${ }^{6}$ The FFF's executive committe comprises of a total of 14 members. The presidents of the Ligue de Football Professionnel (LFP) and the Ligue du Football Amateur (LFA) are ex-officio members. No stakeholder representation rule is provided for the remaining 12 members, which include the national association's president, vice-president, general secretary and general treasurer.

[^10]:    ${ }^{4}$ Including the three deputy speakers elected by the general assembly of the DFL e.V. (two representing the Bundesliga and one representing the 2.Bundesliga). The first and second deputy speakers are also chair and deputy chair of the supervisory board of DFL Deutsche Fußball Liga GmbH respectively.
    ${ }^{5}$ The CEO and the deputy CEO of the DFL Deutsche Fußball Liga GmbH are members of the DFL e.V. executive committee with voting rights. The CEO, in particular, assumes the role of speaker of the ExCo.
    ${ }^{\circ}$ The CEO of the DFL GmbH and the three deputy speakers of the DFL e.V. executive committee.
    The supervisory board of DFL GmbH comprises of the first and second deputy speakers of the executive committee of DFL e.V. and four additional members appointed by the DFL e.V. Two of these members (one each) are elected by the partial assemblies of the Bundesliga and the 2.Bundesliga. The other two are appointed by the League's general assembly.

[^11]:    ${ }^{3}$ The League's Statutes refer to a total of three independent directors on the ExCo , as they consider the president and the CEO as also part of this category.
    ${ }^{4}$ The president of the Lega Serie $A$ is an ex-officio member of the executive committee of the Federazione Italiana Giuoco Calcio (FIGC). The other two Serie A representa-
    tives on the FIGC's ExCo are elected by the League's general assembly.

[^12]:    ${ }^{3}$ The League's Statutes establish that the executive committee shall include between nine and 13 directors - plus a maximum of three auditors - all elected by the general assembly. No specific indication is provided in terms of stakeholder representation. The illustration above reflects the composition of the ExCo as of August 2023.
    ${ }^{4}$ In addition to the members included in the illustration above, the executive committee may include up to five co-opted members. These members may state their opinions during the meetings of the ExCo but have no voting rights.
    ${ }^{5}$ The J.League's president is elected by the League's executive committee from amongst its members.
    ${ }^{6}$ The J.League's president is an ex-officio member of the executive committee of the Japan Football Association (JFA).
    ${ }^{7}$ Members not belonging to any specific stakeholder group and appointed by the JFA's general assembly from amongst the list of candidates submitted by the nominations committee.

[^13]:    ${ }^{3}$ The League's executive committee members (excluding the president and the national association's representative) are elected by the general assembly from amongst the candidates proposed by the president.
    ${ }^{4}$ At least $20 \%$ (but no more than $50 \%$ ) of the executive committee members shall be former players, coaches or referees. Members with no competitive sports background (e.g. individuals with academia, media or legal backgrounds) shall represent $20 \%$ of the ExCo. Female members shall make up at least $30 \%$ of the executive committee
    ${ }^{5}$ Similarly to the case of the K League (see note above), the Statutes of the Korea Football Association (KFA) provide certain parameters that shall be respected with regards to the composition of its executive committee but no specific stakeholder representation rules for most of its members. As of September 2023, the K League's general secretary is a member of the national association's ExCo.

[^14]:    ${ }^{4}$ The structure of the Liga MX does not include an executive committee as such. Notwithstanding the competences assigned to the general assembly, the League's executive functions are conferred to the president. The responsibilities of the president include, among others, ensuring compliance to the Statutes and applicable regulations of the Federación Mexicana de Fútbol (FMF) and to the regulations of the Liga MX. More in general, the president is also responsible for all the operational and administrative functions of the Liga MX .
    ${ }^{5}$ The Liga MX is represented by one member and one vote in the executive committee of the FMF.
    ${ }^{6}$ Other members of the FMF's ExCo include the executive president, the president commissioner (comisionado presidente), one member appointed by the audit committee and one independent member.

[^15]:    ${ }^{3}$ The president and the representatives of Botola Pro D1 and D2 clubs are elected together by the League's general assembly as part of the list presented by the winning presidential candidate.
    ${ }^{4}$ The representatives of players, coaches, referees and sports doctors are elected from within their respective stakeholder groups.
    ${ }^{5}$ The president of the Fédération Royale Marocaine de Football (FRMF) - who is an ex-officio member of the LNFP's executive committee - and two additional national association members selected by him/her.
    ${ }^{6}$ The president of the Ligue Nationale de Football Professionnel (LNFP) is an ex-officio member of the FRMF's executive committee.
    ${ }^{7}$ Other stakeholder groups represented in the FRMF's ExCo include coaches (one member), referees (one), futsal/beach soccer (one) and regional leagues (one).

[^16]:    ${ }^{3}$ The Eredivisie's governance model comprises of both a management board and a supervisory board. The management board is responsible for the day-to-day operations of the League and, as of August 2023, comprises of one member only - the CEO. The illustration above refers to the composition of the League's supervisory board.
    ${ }^{4}$ Namely, the independent chairman elected by the League's general assembly upon proposal from the nominations committee.
    ${ }^{5}$ More specifically, the director of the KNVB's professional football section. The figure reported above in relation to the Eredivisie ( 0.5 seats) is indicative only and meant to account for the fact that the League is one of the two components that make up the KNVB's professional football section (the other being the Eerste Divisie the organization representing the domestic second division).

[^17]:    ${ }^{2}$ The Ekstraklasa's governance model comprises of both a management board and a supervisory board. The management board comprises of a number of members between one and five (currently two), appointed by the supervisory board. The competences of the supervisory board - whose composition is represented in the illustration above - include assessing the proposals submitted by the management board and formulating proposals to the general assembly with regards to the distribution of the funds generated from the commercialization of the League's matches and activities.
    ${ }^{3}$ Four members representing the top four clubs in the last completed Ekstraklasa season and two members appointed by the remaining 14 clubs in the League. ${ }^{4}$ As per the PZPN's Statutes, the clubs competing in top two divisions have the right to jointly select one of the five national association's vice-presidents (representing professional football) and one executive committee member each. With the exception of another vice-president to be selected by the regional associations, no other stakeholder representation rule is provided for the remaining members of the PZPN's executive committee. As such, the final composition of the ExCo depends on the result of the individual elections.

[^18]:    ${ }^{3}$ Including the president of the Qatar Football Association, who is also the ex-officio president of the Qatar Stars League Management.
    ${ }^{4}$ A member nominated by the Qatari Players' Association
    A member 'with experience in football' appointed by the League's president.
    ${ }^{6}$ No specific stakeholder representation rule is provided for the members of the QFA's executive committee. As such, the exact composition of this body is deter mined by the result of the individual elections. Each candidate for a position on the national association's ExCo must be proposed by at least one QFA member. The illustration above reflects the scenario as of September 2023. The OSLM representative is the OFA president who, as detailed above, also serves as the president of the League.

[^19]:    ${ }^{2}$ The president, the vice-president and the two independent directors are elected together as a list by the League's general assembly. Each candidate list shall be supported by at least two member clubs. Notwithstanding the institutional roles mentioned above, all the elected members of the ExCo shall meet the required criteria of independence and neutrality.
    ${ }^{3}$ The SPL's CEO is appointed by the other members of the League's executive committee.
    ${ }^{4}$ As per the SAFF Statutes, the executive committee shall comprise of the president, one vice-president and nine other members. As no specific stakeholder representation rule is provided, the final composition of the ExCo depends on the list presented by the winning presidential candidate in the elections. Each candidate list shall be supported by at least three SAFF members.

[^20]:    ${ }^{4}$ The seven club representatives are elected by the member clubs for a period of four years. The CEO - who is an employee of the league - is selected by the other members of the executive committee.
    ${ }^{5}$ The president of the Premier Soccer League - who is an ex-officio vice-president of the South African Football Association - and three additional members nominated by the League's general assembly.

[^21]:    ${ }^{4}$ Including the two League's vice-presidents - one each elected by the Primera and Segunda División clubs respectively. All clubs represented on the comisión
    delegada are elected within the respective juntas de división.
    ${ }^{5}$ Represented by two professional clubs (currently both competing in the Primera División) as elected by the RFEF's general assembly.

[^22]:    ${ }^{3}$ Including the League's president and vice-president. Out of the nine League's executive committeee members, at least two must come from the French and Italian-speaking regions of Switzerland and two shall represent clubs from the Challenge League.
    ${ }^{4}$ The SFL President in an ex-officio member and vice-president of the ASF's executive committee. The other SFL representative on the national association's ExCo is proposed by the League's executive committee and elected by the ASF's general assembly.

[^23]:    ${ }^{3}$ As per the MLS Constitution, 'the day-to-day affairs of MLS are managed by the league office under the leadership of the commissioner. Generally, the board of governors provides input on strategy, approves the annual budget, and considers and adopts major policies'. Amongst others, the board of governors has the power to employ the commissioner, who serves as the chief executive officer of MLS.
    ${ }^{4}$ The board of governors comprises of one representative for each of the League's investor-operators (the MLS is a single-entity structure. 'Club owners' are shareholders in the league and hold the right to operate a team in a specific market). Investor-operators control a number of votes equal to their ownership percentage in the MLS.
    ${ }^{5}$ A total of 30 MLS clubs (San Diego FC - the most recent expansion team - is set to debut in 2025) have been considered for the purposes of this analysis.

